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This was perfect counsel for the artist-within, not to be forgotten! Ex­
pressed as Nishitani expressed his prajM, so poetically, so musically, it was 
closer to a Bach Fugue in transmitting the unsayable than to a professorial 
promulgation.
His remark on observance came to mind when by that strangeness of fate 
we call coincidence I was in Kyoto last November, grateful that I was privi­
leged to pay profound last respects to the man who exemplified so poignantly 
what it implies to be a werdender Christ, a werdend gewordener Buddhist.
Dirty Water, Clear Thinking
James W. Heisig
I will always remember Nishitani Keiji as the soul of dialogue. For him 
reason was at the fullness of its powers in dictXfyopav. The struggle of the 
philosopher to see things as clearly as possible meant gleaning ideas and pull­
ing them apart in different dialects; it meant arguing, discussing, and making 
up one’s mind in words read and heard, spoken and written. Nishitani saw in 
Plato’s dialogues a model for thinking precisely because the interlocutors 
spoke freely, without a schedule of items for debate. “Dialogue begins,” he 
wrote, “not from an undisputed object of faith, not from any central dogma 
or *1/ but from a letting go of the ego and a submission to reasonableness, 
from an ascent from a standpoint of ego to a standpoint of reason.”1
1 Nishida KitarO (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 43.
2 Published as The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (New York: SUNY Press, 1990).
I last visited Nishitani at his home three years ago. He was eighty-eight years 
old at the time. Graham Parkes of the University of Hawaii and I had just fin­
ished an intense ten days of reworking the final draft of the English translation 
of Nihirizumu.2 The book had been written some forty years before, and the 
translation raised several unresolved problems that we felt only he could 
clarify. Nishitani would have none of it. Each time we brought up an item on 
the little agenda we had prepared, he laughed his inimitable silent laugh and 
began to talk about something else. After nearly an hour of this cat-and- 
mouse game, we finally gave up and closed our notebooks. With that act of 
renunciation, the discussion began in earnest. For the better part of the next
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five hours, we found ourselves straining to look at the things of life in the 
twilight of an old man’s vision.
Nishitani began speaking in Japanese, changed to German for a few 
minutes, and then to English. For the rest of the evening his conversation 
shifted back and forth from one language to another. Master of philosophical 
dialogue that he was, Nishitani had a rare gift of engaging the enthusiasm and 
vitality of his interlocutors. In his presence, one could feel power going out of 
oneself and flowing in, a kind of mutual educatio and inspiratio which 
nothing could frustrate like an agenda or schedule. We should have known bet­
ter than to try.
Nishitani recalled his nihilistic youth, his discovery of Zen Buddhism 
through his friend, D. T. Suzuki, his lifelong affection for the New Testament, 
his enduring attraction to Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra and the novels 
of Dostoevsky—and a whole host of other “elective affinities” that carried 
him through an experiment with a religious life on the boundary between 
Christianity and Buddhism. We left, need it be said, with our original ques­
tions unanswered, but also with a far better sense of what the book we had 
been laboring over meant to its author. No doubt that was Nishitani’s answer.
At one point, around nine o’clock I think it was, the telephone rang, and 
moments later his daughter came to say that Mr. S, coordinator for academic 
affairs for one of Japan’s imported “new religions,” was calling to set a date 
for a lecture. Nishitani disappeared into the back room. I turned to Horio 
Tsutomu of Otani University, who had slipped into the company quietly an 
hour before, and judiciously expressed my surprise that Sensei should enter­
tain such invitations, given his age and the cloud of suspicion that hung over 
the inviting group.
“It is true, they have been after him a lot lately, and I myself asked him 
about it. Do you know what he said?” The young Professor Horio smiled. 
“Sensei picked up a glass of water from the table and held it up to the light. 
‘Looks clean, doesn’t it?’ he said. ‘That makes it easy to drink. But what if it 
were dirty and you were really thirsty?’ He took a drink and set down the 
glass. ‘First let us take care of our thirst. Then we can see about cleaning up 
the water.* **
There is more to Nishitani’s compromise with dirt than meets the moraliz­
ing eye. For him, dialogue with religious truth was, like water, a life necessity. 
However unclean the establishments of religion new and old, one had often to 
drink from their wells or not drink at all. To think always of keeping one’s 
principles free of the dirt—the “unwanted irrelevance,” as Whitehead called 
it—and sanitizing conscience against all moral infection, is a privilege of the 
few who can afford the luxury of choosing their own drink. For the rest,
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within limits, a little filth is necessary. In all but the best of all possible worlds, 
dialogue has often to suspend moral judgment.
At first glance, it would appear that Nishitani drew the line between the 
outright inhuman and the merely human-all-too-human less sharply than 
many scholars in the academy for whom preoccupation with moral principles 
has become a paramount concern. In fact, and here I register a general impres­
sion, he preferred a deliberate naivete when it came to the gap between what 
established religion teaches and what it in fact does. In his dialogue with peo­
ple, he took them at their word, not at their deed.
In no sense did such a posture preclude sharp, even harsh, criticism of false 
ideas. I recall Nishitani’s reply to a question I put him in a 1980 conference on 
“Absolute Nothingness and God.”3 Fresh back from war-torn Nicaragua 
where I had met with friends in the Sandinista government and former 
students, and from a broader research tour of Latin America where I had had 
occasion to see the seamy side of Japanese investments, I asked him for his 
thoughts about the equivalent of a “liberation theology” for Zen and the 
philosophy of absolute nothingness. He made it clear that no ideology of 
“liberation” was to be trusted, that they were all “pseudo-religions” because 
the call for the one true liberation, changing one’s heart and mind, was 
smothered in the clamor of collective reforms. The transcript of that inter­
change does not reflect the temper of his remarks, indeed his annoyance at the 
way the question was put. Still, it is not difficult to read between the lines of 
Nishitani’s allusions to Marxism, Nazism, Imperialism, and so forth a 
disillusionment with the ideologies that had swept through Japan when he was 
a young professor. As he knew only too well, the scars of complicity still mar 
the reputation of the Kyoto philosophers at home and abroad. But, as least as 
long as I knew him, this was clearly a matter to be kept between the lines. It 
was not, and perhaps had never been, part of the main text.
A few years later Jon Sobrino, one of Latin America’s leading liberation 
theologians, came to Japan for a visit. We hosted a formal colloquium with 
him and spent long hours in his company discussing his work in El Salvador. 
He told us that as a theologian he had grown weary of the label “liberation.” 
He said that he had even decided to stop speaking of “the poor,” because he 
found on a trip through the countries of Europe and America that the term 
had become a respectable weapon in the hunt for theological correctness, an 
abstract noun that could be brandished freely without the slightest sense of the 
life-and-death struggle of the people to whom it applies. I mentioned this to 
Nishitani once, expecting him to nod approval. His face darkened, as if to let
’ Afterwards published as (Tokyo: Shunjflsha, 1981). The exchange in
question appears on pages 274-5.
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me know that he had understood the point. Then he went on, “It is true, 
abstractions get reified and concrete realities get rarefied through words. But 
without words, what is left us? Perhaps the point of dialogue is to cure the 
words that have paled and got sick on us.”
The lack of a general symbolic theory among Nishida and his disciples, the 
apparent aversion to the interpretation of unconscious images, the failure to 
take into account the nonverbal meaning communicated through the exchange 
and consumption of goods, and the relative indifference to the effects of 
technology on philosophical thinking are hardly compensated for by such an 
allegiance to the verbal dialogue. In a sense, the oversight is endemic to Zen’s 
longstanding preoccupation with wringing words by the neck until, in their dy­
ing breath, they yield a flash of enlightened insight. If Nishitani saw dialogue 
as reason’s way of healing talk that has broken down, it remains to his suc­
cessors to carry the dialogue into the wider reaches of language.
When he had finished his phone call, Nishitani came back into the room. 
I wanted to ask him more about drinking dirty water, but be immediately 
picked up the conversation where it had left off, as if in mid-sentence a fly had 
been brushed aside from a tea cake and nothing more. It was well after mid­
night when we took our leave. A light summer drizzle was falling outside as 
Nishitani accompanied the three of us into the street. Only at our insistence 
did he let us make our way to the bus stop on our own. Before turning the cor­
ner we looked back to see him still standing there in the half-lit street under 
the umbrella in his kimono and wooden clogs, waving his hand and smiling 
broadly. It is a sight that has been repeated countless times for students and 
colleagues from Japan and around the world.
The immense influence of Nietzsche on Nishitani’s thought is well known. 
As a young man he had carried Zarathustra around with him, as he said, “like 
my Bible.” That he did not contract Nietzsche’s style in his own writing is sur­
prising. The play of aphorisms, the acidic bum of critique, the mixture of 
seriousness and irony in Nietzsche’s inflated self-image, even the play of mask 
and true face—all of these are absent in what I know of Nishitani and his 
work. That he was able to draw so close in spirit to the one man of whom 
Freud said that he had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any 
other person who ever lived or was ever likely to live,4 and yet to resist the en­
chantment of Nietzschean psychology gives us some idea of the seriousness 
with which Nishitani maintained his distance from the West.
4 See Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 
1967), 385.
As if in fulfillment of Goethe’s injunction, “What you have inherited from 
your forbearers, make it your own,” Nishitani seems to have preferred to 
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emulate the courage of Nietzsche’s questioning rather than the responses 
to which they led. He was the willing inheritor of the legacy of nihilism that 
Nietzsche had foreseen would haunt future generations like a shadow until 
they would turn and wrestle the truth from it. In taking up that challenge, 
Nishitani was not content with being himself; he wanted to bear on his 
shoulders the full weight of clear thinking. No faith in country, race, religion, 
or even the cunning of history would be allowed to lighten the load. This was, 
I believe, what made him a great philosopher.
My impression of him in discussion public and private is that his aim was to 
help his listeners free themselves for belief by first freeing themselves from 
what they had simply been made to believe. As much as he prized and even 
delighted in opening horizons and breaking through bias, however, I never 
saw him badger anyone for their narrowmindedness. In my experience, he did 
not judge people by their background, but by the breadth of their perspective. 
And this, in my view, was what made him a great teacher.
As if I were one to know about such things, I am often asked what I con* 
sider Nishitani’s unique contribution to philosophy. Unlike so many Japanese 
thinkers of his age, Nishitani did not put much stock in the quest for the 
uniqueness of Japanese philosophy vis-A-vis Western philosophy, whether his 
own or that of others. On the contrary, I am convinced that he shared Paul 
Ricoeur’s conclusion that •‘all the great philosophies contain the same things, 
but in a different order.”5 But even with that qualification, the question of his 
distinctive contribution is not easy. One risks saying too much or too little. I 
am afraid I shall step a foot into both traps in the remarks that follow.
5 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 461.
4 Andri Malraux, Anti-Memoirs (Hardmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), 10.
“The great mystery is not that we should have been thrown down here at 
random between the profusion of matter and that of the stars; it is that from 
our very prison we should draw, from our own selves, images powerful 
enough to deny our nothingness.” With those words, Andri Malraux captures 
the heart of Western philosophy’s answer to nihilism: only a refinement of in­
ner personal strength can face the fact that life is meaningless, “as if it were 
the libretto for some unknown music,”6 and naysay it. Nishitani’s project was 
the exact opposite: to affirm nothingness by freeing it from the prison of our 
own selves and allowing it to reveal the true face behind the images we throw 
up against it.
The philosophical belief on which Nishitani staked his struggles with 
nihilism was simple: Nihilism, if allowed to mature to term, will be seen to 
bear within itself the seeds of its own death and rebirth; and this process is
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reflected in and contingent upon the transformation of the everyday self or 
ego into a truer, deeper self. With this belief as his lodestone he dipped again 
and again into the rich ore of philosophies East and West to forge a logic 
that would explain this mysterious conjunctio of True Self and Absolute 
Nothingness. In so doing, he elaborated a distinction between modern nihility 
(relative, ego-centered nothingness that stops in nihilism) and classical Bud­
dhist emptiness (absolute, egoless nothingness that is the self-overcoming of 
nihilism), which of itself would merit him a place in the history of twentieth­
century philosophy. Ironically, this insight also alerts us to one of the most 
momentous oversights of his work.
Although the experience of Japan’s experiment with militarism in the Sec­
ond World War brought many Japanese philosophers to their knees—and 
nowhere more eloquently than in Tanabe’s preface to his Metanoetics—the 
Kyoto philosophers have failed to bring the full weight of critical suspicion to 
bear on the particular historical daimon that lay at the root of it all. In 
Nishitani’s case, the call for military disarmament and the plea for peace are 
clear enough in his postwar thinking. Our arsenal of weapons of destruction, 
mass or selective, are inhuman and irreligious in the extreme—this he sees. 
The missing element is the accompanying call for a more radical, cultural 
disarmament.
In Nishitani, as in Nishida before him, the transportation of Oriental, and 
in particular Japanese, modes of thinking to the West was not unlike Chris­
tian missionary movements of the nineteenth century and shared the same am­
biguities. On one hand, it set out for distant shores bent on cracking through 
its own isolationism and giving fresh air to stale thinking. On the other, it 
wrapped its courage in an all but unquestioned belief in the universal value of 
its home culture. In no time, the quest for truth is setting up colonies; it 
forgets how to “build bridges” and “pontificates” instead. Culture becomes a 
weapon.
Nishitani’s case for the advance of Oriental culture to the West may grate 
on us today less roughly than Nishida's had (and certainly shows none of the 
gross misreading of Christian culture that we find in D. T. Suzuki7), but it 
seems, oddly, to have slipped into quarantine and beyond the reach of his 
usual dialogical modes of thought.
7 A good taste of this can be had on pages 272-88 of vol. 22 of the Japanese edition 
of Suzuki’s Collected Works.
In one sense, this is not surprising. Awareness of cultural militarism tends 
to dawn slowly on those armed to the teeth, whereas to the victims of the 
cultural war it is usually as plain as the noonday sun. (The fact, moreover, 
that Japan’s complicity in the current cultural arms race for the control of 
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“development’* in the “underdeveloped” countries is cut of the same cloth as 
that of leading industrial nations in the West further immunizes public policy 
to self-criticism.) The question here is what the philosophical mind can do to 
clear itself of the vestiges of cultural ideology. Tanabe had only hinted at the 
idea of applying an “absolute critique” to “culturalism”; Nishitani’s ap­
proach of the self-overcoming of nihilism seems to offer a way to pursue it in 
the concrete.8
In the same way that nihilism is made to run full term until the tortured vic­
tim of the nihilistic worldview, the discriminating ego, turns on itself and 
“sees through” the nihilistic fiction as its own self-serving invention, so might 
culturism be followed through to its own self-overcoming. Since culture is 
much more in the nature of a collective ethos than philosophical nihilism is, its 
ego-attachments tend to take the form of a tacit, all-encompassing faith that is 
difficult to see, let alone see through. It is less a standpoint than a “standpoint 
of standpoints,” and for that reason all the more indispensable to the traffic 
of language and thought, however self-critical. That Nishida’s search for the 
final standpoint led him first to a rejection of the subject-object dichotomy, 
and then to a reversal of ordinary subject-predicate discourse, was no coin­
cidence. But the breakthrough of language is less than radical if it excludes the 
nonverbal forms of marking and signing that are the life’s blood of culture. 
Only by turning the tools of culture to a critique of the culturally limited ego 
does it become possible to assess when and where one cultural standpoint is be­
ing used as a weapon against another. Nishitani’s model of nihilism overcom­
ing itself would suggest that a full and radical inculturation in one’s own 
culture would remain incomplete until it had overcome itself by dying to itself.
If one takes culture as a whole or in the abstract, such an overcoming would 
be like jumping out of one’s skin. But if one takes culture in the concrete as a 
manifestation of collective habits of thought and activity, then only a self­
awakening to our own culture-boundedness can alert us to the way in which 
these tools can be wielded as weaponry. This, in turn, would open up the 
horizon of a cultural nothingness, a transformation from the relative cultural 
ego to the absolute cultural self. If I have not misread him, Nishitani did not 
go this far; if my instincts are correct, he could have.
’ See the Preface of Metanoetics. In chapter 2 of his next book, [Ex-
istenz, Love, and Praxis] Tanabe comes very close to making the connection between 
Nishitani’s model and a critique of culturism that I am making here, although without 
any acknowledgement to Nishitani, whose position had already been published in the 
pages of Religion and Nothingness. Raymundo Panikkar, incidentally, has a book 
forthcoming (in Spanish) in the subject of cultural disarmament. It is to him that I owe 
the term.
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